JAMHURI YAOMBA WAKILI MAGAFU AONYWE

Na Happiness Katabazi

UPANDE wa Jamhuri katika kesi ya wizi sh bilioni 1.8 fedha za Akaunti ya Madeni ya Nje katika Benki Kuu ya Tanzania, umeiomba Mahakama ya Hakimu Mkazi Kisutu Dar es Salaam, itoe onyo kali kwa wakili wa wa utetezi, Majura Magafu, kwa sababu amekuwa akitumia mbinu za makusudi kuchelewesha kesi.


Kesi hiyo inamkabili Mweka Hazina wa CCM Mkoa wa Kigoma, Rajabu Maranda na Farijara Hussein ambao wanatetewa na Magafu.

Ombi hili lilitolewa jana na Wakili Kiongozi wa Serikali, Stanslaus Boniface, aliyekuwa akisaidiwa na Wakili Mwandamizi Fredrick Manyanda na Kimaro mbele ya jopo la Mahakimu Wakazi linaloongozwa na Saul Kinemela, Focus Bampikya na Elvin Mugeta ambapo aliiambia mahakama kuwa kesi hiyo ilikuja jana kwa shahidi wa tatu wa utetezi kutoa ushahidi.

Wakili Kiongozi Stanslaus aliambia mahakama wao wako tayari kuendelea na kesi hiyo lakini cha kushangaza wakili Magafu na shahidi huyo juzi na jana hawakutokea mahakamani na wala hajawasilisha taarifa zozote.

“Waheshimiwa mahakimu, Magafu ni ofisa mahakama wa siku nyingi taratibu zote za kutoa udhuru anazijua lakini ameshindwa kufanya hivyo badala yake wateja wake(washtakiwa)kizimbani wanakuja kueleza mahakama kuwa eti walimtafuta wakili wao huyo na wakamkuta katika hospitali ya Amana akisubiri tiba lakini chakushangaza huyo wakili wao ameshindwa kuleta vyeti mahakamani kuonyesha anaumwa:

“Sisi tunasema hii ni mbinu mpya inayotumiwa na wakili huyo kuchelewesha kesi za EPA zisimalizike haraka na kwa wakati kwani hapo awali waliwasilisha nia ya kukatia rufaa Mahakama Kuu uamuzi wa mahakama hii uliowaona washtakiwa hao wanakesi ya kujibu,na wakati wakiwasilisha nia hiyo ya kukata rufaa wakili Magafu alikuwa anafahamu fika sheria inakata uamuzi huo kukatiwa rufaa, na kesi hii ilisimama kwa miezi kadhaa bila kuendelea na baadaye akaamua kuondoa nia hiyo….sisi upande wa Jamhuri tunaomba mahakama hii itoe onyo kali kwa upande wa utetezi kwani sisitunaamini wanatumia mbinu hizo kwaajili ya kuchelewesha kesi hii isimalizike kwa wakati ….sisi tumeishachoka na hizi kesi tunataka zimalizike haraka.

Kiongozi wa jopo Hakimu Mkazi Kinemela alikiri kesi hiyo kuwa ni ya muda mrefu na kuahidi kuyafikisha kwenye uongozi wa mahakama ili yapatiwe ufumbuzi na kuiahirisha kesi hadi Julai 26-31 itakapoendelea kusikilizwa.

Chanzo:Gazeti la Tanzania Daima la Jumamosi, Juni 26 mwaka 2010

TANZANIA INA MAWAKILI 1,322-JAJI JUNDU

Na Happiness Katabazi

JAJI Kiongozi wa Mahakama Kuu nchini, Fakhi Jundu amesema hadi kufikia jana taifa lina jumla ya mawakili wa kujitegemea 1322 idadi ambayo alisema ni ndogo ukilinganisha na nchi jirani za Jumuiya ya Afrika Mashariki.


Jaji Jundu aliyasema katika mkutano wake na waandishi wa habari uliofanyika jana ofisini kwake ikiwa ni muda mfupi tu baada ya Jaji Mkuu Agustino Ramadhani kufunga sherehe za kuwakubali na kuwasajili mawakili wapya 128 toka 1194 iliyofanyika katika viwanja vya Mahakama Kuu Kanda ya Dar es Salaam na kuudhuliwa na watu mbalimbali akiwemo mke wa rais,Salma Kikwete.

Alisema mahitaji ya uhuduma ya mawakili inazidi kuongeza lakini idadi ya mawakili wa kujitegemea hapa nchini bado haikidhi mahitaji ukilinganisha na nchi kama ya Kenya ambayo ina zaidi ya mawakili 3000.

“Nchi yetu ni mwanachama wa Jumuiya ya Afrika Mashariki na huko tuendako milango itafunguliwa ambapo mawakili toka nchi hizo watakuwa wakiruhusiwa kwenda kutoa huduma za kisheria katika mahakama za nchi jirani,hivyo idadi ya mawakili wa kujitegemea isipoongezeka nchini ni wazi tutashindwa kufurukuta;

“Hivyo sisi kama mhimili wa mahakama nchini tumejipanga kuakikisha tunaendelea kuapisha mawakili wengi zaidi ili taifa liwe na mawakili wengi ambao wataenda kutoa huduma hiyo kwa wananchi lakini pia ni washauri mawakili hawa wa kujitegemea ofisi zao za kisheria wanazozifungua waakikishe inakuwa na mawakili wengi ili wakili mmoja akiumwa, akipa udhuru au akienda mahakama nyingine kusikiliza kesi ya mteja mwingine basi wawepo mawakili toka kwenye ofisi hiyo ambaye ataweza kuendelea kutoa huduma kwa wateja” alisema Jaji Kiongozi Jundu.

Jaji Jundu alisema idadi hiyo ya mawakili wapya 128 imegawanyika katika mafungu mawili, kundi la kwanza ni waombaji 53 waliohitimu shahada ya sheria na baadaye kuhitimu katika chuo cha Wanasheria kwa Vitendo na kuongeza kuwa kundi hilo ni la kihistoria kwa vile hii ni mara ya kwanza kwa wanasheria wanaohitimu kutoka chuo hicho kukubaliwa kuwa mawakili kwa mujibu wa kifungu cha 12(3) cha Sheria ya chuo hicho ya mwaka 2007.Kundi la pili lina waaombaji 75 ambao walipitia usaili wa Baraza la Elimu ya Sheria.

Alisema hapa nchini mawakili wa kujitegemea wengi ofisi zao zina mawakili wasiozidi watatu au wakili mmoja hali inayosababisha baadhi ya wateja kusita kuwapatia kazi za kuwawakilisha mahakamani kwa hofu kuwa inaweza ikatokea wakili huyo akapata udhuru na hivyo akashindwa kumwakilisha mahakamani au kumpatia msaada wowote wa kisheria kwa muda mwafaka na kuongeza tayari mawakili wa nchi jirani wameishaondokana na kasumba hiyo na sasa ofisi moja ya mawakili inakuwa na zaidi ya mawakili kumi.

Hata hivyo aliwashauri waombaji li waomba usajili wa mawakili ambao bado majina yao hayajapitishwa kuwa mawakili,wawasiliane na Baraza la Elimu la Sheria ambalo yeye ni Mwenyekiti wake ili waweze kujua ni tarehe gani wamepangiwa kuja kufanya usahili nakuongeza wamefanya mabadiliko na kwamba kila wiki sasa wamekuwa wakiwahoji waombaji 20 hapa jijini Dar es Salaam, na siyo Arusha peke yake kama ilivyozoeleka hapo zamani.

Naye mtoto wa rais, Ridhiwan Kikwete ambaye alikuwa miongoni mwa mawakili wapya waliopewa usajili aliwaambia waandishi wa habari kwamba anafuraha kupata usajili huo na kwamba ndoto yake ya siku nyingi ya kuwa wakili imetimia na kuahidi kwamba katika taaluma yake ya sheria anachozingatia ni kutenda haki na sivinginevyo.

Chanzo:Gazeti la Tanzania Daima la Ijumaa, Juni 25 mwaka 2010

UN KUENDELEA KUGHARAMIA MAFUNZO KWA WANAHABARI

Na Happiness Katabazi, Zanzibar

UMOJA wa Mataifa (UN) nchini Tanzania umesema utaendelea kutoa fedha za kugharamia mafunzo ya habari za uchunguzi kwa waandishi wa habari wa Tanzania Bara na Visiwani, kwani wanaamini habari zikifanywa kikamilifu zitaendelea kuleta maendeleo nchini.


Ofisa Habari wa Umoja wa Mataifa - Tanzania, Usiah Nkhoma Ledama, alitoa kauli hiyo hivi karibuni katika Hoteli ya Zanzibar Ocean View wakati akifunga mafunzo ya wiki moja ya waandishi wa habari yaliyofadhiliwa na UN-Tanzania, Unesco na kuratibiwa na Shule ya Uandishi wa Habari na Mawasiliano ya Umma ya Chuo Kikuu cha Dar es Salaam (SJMC).

Alisema lengo la kufadhili mafunzo hayo ni kwamba wanaamini vyombo vya habari ni wadau muhimu katika kuleta maendeleo katika taifa lolote duniani, hivyo akawaasa wahitimu hao kwenda kutumia vema elimu hiyo, ili waweze kuleta maendeleo kwa taifa.

“Sisi kama UN nia ya kukuza taaluma ya habari tunayo na ndiyo maana mafunzo haya ni ya pili kufanyika hapa nchini na tutaendelea kutoa mafunzo kama haya hapa nchini na tutagharamia haya mafunzo ili vyombo vya habari viwe vinaandika mazuri ya UN, hivyo tunaomba kila mmoja wenu aliyepata mafunzo hayo akawe chachu ya kuleta mabadiliko ya utendaji,” alisema Nkhoma.

Kwa upande wake, Mhadhiri Mwandamizi wa Chuo cha Uandishi wa Habari na Mawasiliano ya Umma - Chuo Kikuu cha Dar es Salaam, Dk. Ireneus Kapoli, alisema kazi ya uandishi wa habari za uchunguzi si kazi rahisi, hivyo akawataka waandishi wote kuacha woga na kuandika habari za uchunguzi kwa kuzingatia maadili na miiko ya taaluma ya uandishi wa habari.

Chanzo:Gazeti la Tanzania Daima la Alhamisi 24 mwaka 2010

SOPHIA SIMBA UMEGEUKA KUNGWI?



Na Happiness Katabazi
RAIS Jakaya Kikwete wakati akipanga safu yake ya uongozi muda mfupi tu tangu alipoapishwa, hakuficha dhamira yake kwa kutamka bayana kwamba katika uongozi wake atahakikisha anawateua wanawake wenye sifa za uongozi.

Nadiriki kukiri bila kumng’unya maneno kwamba rais amejitahidi kuitekeleza kwa vitendo dhamira hiyo.

Nasema hivyo kwa sababu tumeshuhudia wanawake wengi ukilinganisha na awamu zilizopita, ambao wameweza kushika nafasi mbalimbali za uongozi.

Ni nia njema ya rais wetu kutaka kutuinua sisi wanawake ili tuweze kushiriki kwenye ngazi za uamuzi, lakini ili wananchi waendelee kuamini anachoamini rais kwamba wanawake wanaweza kama walivyo wanaume, ndiyo maana ameamua kuwabeba kwa mbeleko.

Lakini Juni 20, mwaka huu, Mwenyekiti wa Jumuiya ya Umoja wa Wanawake (CCM) Taifa, Sophia Simba, ambaye ni Waziri wa Nchi, Ofisi ya Rais (Utawala Bora), aliwataka wanawake wa jumuiya hiyo wanaoishi na wanaume ambao si wanachama wa CCM kuwanyima waume wao unyumba kwa lengo la kuwakomesha.

“Ninyi wanawake wenzangu ambao waume zenu wapo katika vyama pinzani na mnajua wazi kuwa hawawapi ushirikiano wowote katika siasa ya CCM wanyimeni ‘nonino’, muone kama hawatarejea katika chama tawala, nonino nikiwa na maana ya tendo la ndoa,” alisema Sophia huku akishangiliwa na wanawake wote kuonyesha kuwa alilolisema limewagusa.

Agizo la Waziri Simba kwa wanawake wa CCM, ni wazi kabisa limetia doa jitihada za rais za kuwapa madaraka wanawake, kwani si siri, baadhi ya wananchi wamekuwa wakihoji uwezo wa kiutendaji wa kiongozi huyo.

Wananchi wameibuka na maswali kutokana na waziri huyo mara kadhaa kunukuliwa na vyombo vya habari akitoa matamko ambayo hayarandani na nyadhifa alizonazo.

Hakuna ubishi kwamba taifa hili limo kwenye vita dhidi ya ugonjwa wa ukimwi, pia ongezeko la watoto wa mitaani, lakini cha kushangaza, waziri halioni hilo hadi anaamua kutoa agizo la wanawake wa CCM kuwanyima unyumba waume wao ambao ni wanachama wa vyama vya upinzani.

Kwa mtazamo wangu, binadamu aliyekamilika na ambaye yumo ndani ya ndoa, kuna wakati huhitaji unyumba, sasa kama mwanadamu huyo ambaye ni mume wa mwanamke wa CCM, asipopewa haki yake ya ndoa, eti kwa sababu waziri amewaambia wake zao wawanyime unyumba, ni wazi wanaume wengi wataamua kutafuta njia mbadala, ili kuwapata wanawake wengine pembeni.

Nao wanawake watakapohitaji tendo la ndoa, je waende wapi?Au tayari ameishawatafutia wanaume wengine ambao watawatimizia hamu hiyo?

Kama tunavyojua, ukimwi umetamalaki, mwanamume huyo anapokwenda kutafuta mwanamke mwingine, tuna uhakika gani kuwa mwanamke huyo mpya hajaambukizwa maradhi ya ukimwi?

Si kuambukizwa ukimwi tu, je, ikitokea mwanamume aliyenyimwa unyumba na mkewe akahamia nyumba ndogo, si ni wazi anaweza kutelekeza familia yake na wakati mwingine kusahau au kupunguza kupeleka matunzo kwa familia yake ya awali?
Hivi watakaopata shida si watoto ambao hawana hatia na mwanamke aliyerubuniwa na agizo la Simba?

Hivi huyu Simba alivyotoa agizo la kipuuzi kama hili huku akijua yeye ni Waziri ambaye wizara yake inaziongoza idara nyeti kama Idara ya Usalama wa Taifa,hivi anataka watumishi wa idara hiyo wananchi kwa ujumla wamueleweje?Je waendelee kumheshimu kama Waziri wao au sasa waanze kuamini waziri wao amejigeuza na kuwa Somo au Kungwi? Hatukuelewi.

Na yote hayo yakishatokea mwisho wa siku huyo mwanamke aliyetekeleza agizo la Simba, si atakuwa wa kwanza kulalamika kwamba mumewe kamtelekeza na kukimbilia mahakamani kudai haki na mwisho wa siku watoto watakosa ada za shule na wengine kujikuta wakijiingiza kwenye vitendo haramu vya uvutaji bangi, ukahaba na ombaomba mitaani?

Wakati umefika kwa viongozi wanawake wote mliopewa madaraka kama rais wetu alivyoahidi kuwainua wanawake, mchunge kauli zenu na nyendo zenu, muwajibike kwa masilahi ya taifa ili hata wale wote waliokuwa wakiibeza dhamira hiyo ya rais wakose la kusema.

Namshauri Waziri Simba achague maneno ya kuongea mbele ya umma, kwani kwa agizo hilo endapo litatekelezwa ni wazi litavunja ustawi wa jamii yetu.

Mungu ibariki Tanzania, Mungu ibariki Afrika.

0716 774494
Chanzo:Gazeti la Tanzania Daima la Alhamisi Juni 24 mwaka 2010

RUFAA YA KASUSURA YAGONGA MWAMBA




Na Happiness Katabazi

MAHAKAMA Kuu Kanda ya Dar es Salaam, imetupilia mbali rufaa iliyokatwa na aliyekuwa dereva wa kampuni ya Ulinzi ya Knight Support, Justine Kasusura kwa maelezo kwamba sababu sita alizozitumia kukata rufaa zimeshindwa kuthibitisha kwamba Hukumu ya Mahakama ya Hakimu Mkazi Kisutu iliyomtia hatiani kwa makosa unyang’anyi wa kutumia silaha na wizi dola milioni mbili za Marekani mali ya Citibank ilikuwa na dosari za kisheria.


Hukumu ya Rufaa hiyo ilitolewa jana na Jaji Mstaafu Thomas Mihayo ambaye alisema baada ya kupitia kwa kina hukumu iliyotolewa Aprili mosi mwaka 2007 na aliyekuwa Hakimu Mkuu Mfawidhi wa Mahakama ya Kisutu ambaye sasa ni Jaji wa Mahakama Kuu, Sivangilwa Mwangesi ilikidhi matakwa ya kisheria na ilikuwa sahihi kuwaachiria huru washtakiwa wengine waliokuwa wakishtakiwa na mshtakiwa huyo.

Mwangesi alimtia hati Kasusura kwa makosa hayo mawili, kosa unyanganyi wa kutumia silaha ambalo ni kinyume na kifungu cha 285 na 286 alimhukumu kwenda jela miaka tano na viboko 12 na kosa la wizi ambalo ni mbadala wa shataka la unyanganyi wa kutumia silaha kinyume na kifungu cha 265 vya Sheria ya Kanuni ya Adhabu ya mwaka 2002, alimhukumu kwenda jela miaka 30.

“Baada ya kupitia kwa kina hukumu ya mahakama ya chini na sababu sita za kukata rufaa zilizowasilishwa hapa na mrufani, mahakama inatupilia mbali rufaa ya mrufani na badala yake inakubalina na hoja za upande wa Jamhuri zilizodai kuwa hukumu ya Mahakama ya Kisutu ilikuwa sahihi kumhukumu adhabu hiyo,” alisema.

Aidha, alisema kisheria tangu awali mrufani alipowasilisha rufaa yake ,mahakama ilipaswa iifute rufaa hiyo kwa sababu ilikuwa imekiuka sheria, lakini ili kusahihisha adhabu iliyotolewa na mahakama ya chini ndiyo maana haikuifuta rufaa hiyo kwa sababu hakimu Mwangesi alikosea kibinadamu alipomtia hatiani katika kosa la unyang’anyi wa kutumia na kuamuru aende jela miaka mitano.

Jaji Mihayo alisahihisha adhabu huyo na kusema kuwa katika kosa la kwanza atatumikia ambalo ni la unyang’anyi wa kutumia silaha mrufani atumikia miaka 30 jela na viboko 12 na kosa la wizi atatumikia miaka mitano na kwamba adhabu hizo ataitumikia kwa pamoja.

Chanzo:Gazeti la Tanzania Daima la Alhamisi,Juni 24 mwaka 2010

WAPIGANAJI MMETUONA!!!!


Kushoto ni mimi (Happiness) na Mhariri wa Gazeti la Mwanahalisi, Jabir Idrisa tikibalishana mawazo muda mfupi baada ya kuitimu mafunzo hayo ya habari za uchunguzi(IJ) yaliyofanyika katika hoteli ya Zanzibar Ocean View iliyopo Zanzibar.

TUMEFUZU MAFUNZO HABARI ZA UCHUNGUZI(IJ)



Nikiwa na waandishi wa habari toka vyombo Tanzania Bara na Visiwani, kwenye picha ya pamoja baada ya kuitimu mafunzo ya habari za uchunguzi(IJ)yaliyofanyika Juni 14-18 mwaka huu, Zanzibar Ocean View Hoteli, Zanzibar ambayo yaliandaliwa na Umoja wa Mataifa(UN-Tanzania), UNESCO na Kuratibiwa na Shule ya Uandishi wa Habari na Mawasiliano ya Umma ya Chuo Kikuu cha Dar es Salaam(SJMC).

VITA YA LUKUVI MAHAKAMANI

Na Happiness Katabazi

OFISA Ardhi wa Manispaa ya Wilaya ya Kinondoni Dar es Salaam, Magesa Magesa(33) jana alifikishwa katika Mahakama ya Hakimu Mkazi Kisutu akikabiliwa na shtaka moja la kughushi dondoo ya barua inayoonyesha imetolewa na Mkurugenzi wa Manispaa hiyo, Noel Mkomola Mahyenga.


Kufikishwa kwa mshtakiwa huyo mahakamani jana kunafuatia amri ya Mkuu wa Mkoa wa Dar es Salaam, William Lukuvi aliyoitoa wiki iliyopita ambapo alizifunga ofisi za Ardhi katika Manispaa ya Kinondoni baada ya kupata taarifa kutoka kwa raia wema kwamba baadhi ya maofisa ardhi wamekuwa wakijiusisha na vitendo vya ufisadi katika suala zima la utoaji hati za kumiliki ardhi kwa wananchi.

Katika kesi hiyo iliyofika kwa mara ya kwanza jana mahakamani hapo, Wakili wa Serikali Betha Misonge mbele ya Hakimu Mkazi Gabrile Milumbe alidai kuwa Magesa ambaye anatetewa na wakili wa kujitegemea Godwin Mussa na Majura Magafu alidai mshtakiwa huyo alitenda kosa hilo la kughushi kinyume na kifungu cha 333,335(a) na 337 cha Sheria ya Kanuni ya Adhabu ya mwaka 2002.

Misonge alidai kuwa tarehe na muda usiyojulikana mwaka 2009 , mshtakiwa huyo alidanganya na kisha akagushi dondoo ya barua yenye kumbukumbu Na.TBW/ADM/IN/250/2009 ya Juni 8 mwaka jana,inayotoka Tanzania Building Works Ltd kwa lengo la kuonyesha kwamba Mkurugenzi huyo wa Manispaa ya Kinondoni, Mahyenga alitoa kibali kumilikishwa ardhi katika kitalu Na.1274/1275 kilichopo Msasani Penisula kwa Tanzania Building Works Ltd huku akijua nondoo za barua hiyo ni za kughushi.

Hata hivyo mshtakiwa huyo alikana shtaka hilo na wakili wa serikali Misonge alidai hawana pingamizi la dhamana kwa mshtakiwa na hakimu mkazi Mirumbe alisema ili mshtakiwa apate dhamana ni lazima atoe mahakamani sh milioni 10 au wadhamini wawili mmoja ambaye atatoa hati ya mali yenye thamani hiyo.

Hata hivyo Hakimu Mirumbe alisema utekelezwaji wa masharti hayo ya dhamana utafanyika kesho(leo) hivyo akaamuru mshtakiwa apelekwe rumande na arudishwe leo kwaajili ya kuja kutimiza masharti ya dhamana.

Chanzo:Gazeti la Tanzania Daima la Jumanne, Juni 22 mwaka 2010

MTIKILA MAHAKAMANI

Na Happiness Katabazi
MWENYEKITI wa Democratic Party (DP), Mchungaji Christopher Mtikila, jana alifikishwa tena katika Mahakama ya Hakimu Mkazi Kisutu Dar es Salaam, akikabiliwa na makosa mawili ya kusambaza na kumiliki waraka wa uchochezi dhidi ya Rais wa Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete.

Wakili wa Serikali Angel Chacha aliyekuwa akisaidiwa na Inspekta Francis Mboya mbele ya Hakimu Mkazi Michael Mteite alidai kuwa Mtikila amefanya makosa hayo ya uchochezi ambayo ni kinyume cha kifungu cha 32(1)(c) cha Sheria ya Magazeti ya mwaka 1976.

Chacha alidai kuwa shtaka la kwanza ni kuwa mnamo Novemba mosi mwaka 2009-Aprili 17 mwaka huu, ndani ya jiji akiwa na nia ya uchochezi Mtikila alisambaza kwa umma waraka uliochapishwa ambao una kichwa cha habari kisemacho: ‘Kikwete kuangamiza ukristo, Wakristo waungane upesi wamuweke Mkristo Ikulu’ huku akijua maneno hayo ni ya kichochezi.

Alidai shtaka la pili ni kwamba Aprili 16, mwaka huu, huko nyumbani kwake Mikocheni bila kibali alikuwa akimiliki waraka huo wa kichochezi ambao ulikuwa na maneno hayo.
Kwa upande wake, Mtikila alikana mashtaka yote na wakili huyo wa serikali aliiambia mahakama kuwa hawana pingamizi na dhamana na kwamba upelelezi wa kesi hiyo bado haujakamilika.

Aidha, Hakimu Mkazi Mteite alisema ili mshtakiwa apate dhamana ni lazima awe na wadhamini wawili wanaotoka taasisi zinazotambulika au wadhamini hao wawili watoe fedha taslimu sh 500,000 kila mmoja, lakini hata hivyo ilipofika saa saba mchana Mtikila alidhaminiwa na wadhamini wawili ambao wanatoka taasisi zinazotambulika kisheria na hivyo kumfanya apate dhamana.

Kabla ya hakimu kuingia ndani ya ukumbi wa mahakama kuanza kusikiliza kesi hiyo, Mtikila alisema maneno yafuatayo kwa sauti ya juu: ‘Serikali ilifikiri ikinileta leo (jana) mahakamani nitamkana Bwana wangu Yesu na mwokozi wangu…kamwe siwezi kumkana…nyie waandishi wa habari wengine si Wakristo jitokezeni basi mnidhamini au mnaogopa kushughulikiwa na serikali,” alisema Mtikila huku akionekana mwenye furaha muda wote.
Hii ni kesi ya pili ya kumkashifu Kikwete kufunguliwa katika mahakama ya Kisutu, kesi ya kwanza ambayo imeishaanza kusikilizwa ni ile aliyomuita kiongozi huyo wa nchi kuwa ni gaidi na anaukumbatia Uislamu.

Pia ni mara ya 41 sasa serikali inamfungulia kesi ya kutoa maneno ya uchochezi na kesi nyingi ameshinda isipokuwa kesi moja ya uchochezi iliyokuwa imefunguliwa Mahakama ya Wilaya ya Kinondoni mbele ya Hakimu Gabriel Mirumbe mwishoni mwa miaka ya 1990, ambapo Mtikila alidaiwa kutoa maneno ya uchochezi alipodai CCM ilimuua aliyekuwa Katibu Mkuu wa chama hicho, Horace Kolimba, na ndipo mahakama hiyo ya wilaya ilipomfunga jela mwaka mmoja na alitumikia kifungo hicho katika gereza la Ukonga.
Chanzo:Gazeti la Tanzania Daima la Jumanne, Juni 22 mwaka 2010

HUKUMU YA RUFAA YA MGOMBEA BINAFSI

THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT DAR ES SALAAM

RAMADHANI, C. J.; MUNUO, J. A.; MSOFFE J. A.; KIMARO,J.A
MBAROUK, J.A.;LUANDA, J. A. ; And MJASIRI, J.A.)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 45 OF 2009 BETWEEN
THE HONOURABLE ATTORNEY GENERAL ... APPELLANT
AND
REVEREND CHRISTOPHER MTIKILA ... RESPONDENT
(Appeal from the Judgment of the High Court of Tanzania at Dar
Es Salaam,)

(Manento, J. K.; Massati, J. And Mihayo, J.)
dated the 5th day of May , 200 in Misc. Civil Cause No. 10 of 2005 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT.

RAMADHANI, C. J.:
For the ease of reference and to avoid a possible mix-up and confusion, we shall refer to the parties simply as Rev. Mtikila for Reverend Christopher
Mtikila, the respondent/petitioner, on the one hand, and the A. G. for the
Attorney General, the appellant/respondent, on the other hand. Also to
appreciate most fully what is at stake in this appeal we have to preface this
judgment with a brief background.
1
Way back in 1993 Rev. Mtikila filed Misc. Civil Cause No. 5 of 1993,
challenging, among other matters, the prohibition of independent
candidates for presidential, parliamentary and civic elections which was
introduced by the Eighth Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992. That Act
amended Art. 39 which previously provided as follows:
No person shall be eligible for election to the office of
President of the United Republic unless he -
(a) has attained the age of forty years; and
(b) is otherwise qualified for election as a Member of
the National Assembly or of the (Zanzibar) House
of Representatives.
The Eighth Amendment retained the above paragraphs but re-numbered
them as (b) and (d) respectively and added new paragraphs (a) and (c)
which state:
(a) is a citizen of the United Republic by birth;
(c) is a member of and sponsored by a political party.
That requirement for membership of and sponsorship by a political party
applies also to parliamentary elections under Articles 67 and 77 and to local
councils elections under s. 39 of the Local Authorities (Elections) Act, 1979,
as amended by the Local Authorities (Elections) (Amendment) Act, _
(Act No 7 of 1992).
Rev. Mtikila's contention before LUGAKINGIRA, J. (as he then was) was
that the requirement for membership of and sponsorship by a political
party abridged the right to participate in national public affairs under Art.
21(1) of the Constitution which provides:-
Every citizen of the United Republic is entitled to take part
in matters pertaining to the governance of the country,
either directly or through representatives freely elected by
the people in conformity with procedures laid down by, or in
accordance with, the law.
LUGAKINGIRA, J. poignantly summed up his dilemma as we shall see later
and concluded that:
For every thing I have endeavored to s tate and
notwithstanding the exclusionary elements to that effect in
arts 39, 67 and 77 of the Constitution as well as s 39 of the
Local Authorities (Elections) Act 1979, I declare and
direct that it shal l be lawful for independent
candidates, along with candidates sponsored by
political parties, to contest presidential,
3
parliamentary and local council elections. This will not
apply to the council elections due in a few days. (Emphasis is
ours.)
The learned judge restrained himsel f not to declare the various
constitutional provisions to be unconstitutional though he had been invited
to do so. We shall revert to this at an appropriate stage.
However, soon after that judgment the A. G. reacted in two simultaneous
ways: he filed an appeal in this Court and sent to Parliament the Eleventh
Constitutional Amendment, Act No. 34 of 1994, whose effect was to nullify
the declaration and the direction of LUGAKINGIRA, J. and to maintain the
constitutional position which had been before the decision of Misc. Civil
Cause No. 5 of 1993.
We have already reproduced Article 21(1) in English version but for the
sake of clarity we shall recite it again in Kiswahili, both as it was before its
amendment by Act 34 of 1994, and as it reads now after the amendment.
Before the amendment it read as follows:
4
as amended by the Local Authorities (Elections) (Amendment) Act, 1992,
(Act No 7 of 1992).
Rev. Mtikila's contention before LUGAKINGIRA, J. (as he then was) was
that the requirement for membership of and sponsorship by a political
party abridged the right to participate in national public affairs under Art.
21(1) of the Constitution which provides:-
Every citizen of the United Republic is entitled to take part
in matters pertaining to the governance of the country,
either directly or through representatives freely elected by
the people in conformity with procedures laid down by, or in
accordance with, the law.
LUGAKINGIRA, J. poignantly summed up his dilemma as we shall see later
and concluded that:
For every thing I have endeavored to s tate and
notwithstanding the exclusionary elements to that effect in
arts 39, 67 and 77 of the Constitution as well as s 39 of the
Local Authorities (Elections) Act 1979, I declare and
direct that it shall be lawful for independent
candidates, along with candidates sponsored by
political parties, to contest presidential,
3
Kila raia wa Jamhuri ya Muungano anayo haki ya kushiriki
katika shughuli za utawala wa nchi, ama moja kwa moja au
kwa kupitia wawakilishi waliochaguliwa na wananchi kwa
hiari yao, kwa kuzingatia utaratibu uliowekwa na sheria au
kwa mujibu wa sheria.
After the amendment that sub-Article reads the same way but it is prefaced
by the following formulation:
Bila ya kuathiri masharti ya Ibara ya 39, ya 47 na ya 67 ya
Katiba hii na ya sheria za nchi kuhusiana na masharti ya
kuchaguwa na kuchaguliwa, au kuteua na kuteuliwa
kushiriki katika shughuli za utawala wa nchi,
That reads in English as follows:
Subject to the provisions of Articles-39, 47 and 67 of this
Constitution and of the laws of the land in connection with
the conditions for electing and being elected or for
appointing and being appointed to take part in matters
related to governance of the country, ...
In the petition, Misc. Civil Cause No. 10 of 2009, the subject matter of this
appeal, Rev. Mtikila challenged the Eighth Amendment and asked the High
Court of Tanzania to grant the following four prayers:
5
(a) A declaration that the constitutional amendment to Articles 39 and
67 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania as
introduced by amendments contained in Act No. 34 of 1994 is
unconstitutional.
(b) A declaration that the petitioner has a constitutional right under
Article 21 (1) of the Constitution of the United Republic of
Tanzania to contest for the post of the seat of a member of
parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania as a private
candidate.
(c) Costs of this petition be borne by the Respondent.
(d) Any other remedy and/or relief the honourable Court will deem
equitable to grant.
Three judges of the High Court of Tanzania, MANENTO, J. K., MASSATI, J.,
and MIHAYO, J. (all three Judges as they then were) granted the prayers
except for costs which they ordered each party to bear its own. We better
let the High Court speak for itself:
We thus proceed to declare the alleged amendments
unconstitutional and contrary to the International Covenants
to which Tanzania is a party.
The A. G. has preferred this appeal in which he was represented by Mr.
George Masaju, the learned Deputy Attorney General, assisted by Mr.
6
Matthew Mwaimu, learned Principal State Attorney. The respondent, on the
other hand, had the services of Mr. Richard Rweyongeza, learned
advocate, assisted by Mr. Mpale Mpoki, learned counsel.
The Chief Justice decided that the appeal be heard by a Full Bench of
seven Justices of Appeal. He also invited four friends of the Court: Mr.
Othman Masoud, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Zanzibar; Prof.
Palamagamba Kabudi; Prof. Jwan Mwaikusa and the Chairman of the
National Electoral Commission, who was represented by the Director of
Elections, Mr. Rajabu Kiravu. We are extremely grateful to all.
First and foremost let us take the opportunity to correct one thing: There is
nothing like "a private candidate". That is a direct translation from Kiswahili
"mgombea binafsi". But the right terminology is "an independent
candidate", as Prof. Kabudi, properly pointed out, and in this judgment we
shall use that terminology.
The A. G. had seven grounds of appeal but at the hearing he dropped
grounds three and five and consolidated grounds one and two. However, in
7
this judgment we are going to deal with grounds one and two separately.
Otherwise, we are going to follow the order in which Mr. Masaju argued
the remaining five grounds which will, necessarily, be renumbered.
Mr. Masaju started with the last ground, ground number 7, which is now
ground number 5, and which avers as follows:
That the High Court erred in law in proceeding with the
determination of the petition without framing issues.
Admittedly, the High Court did not frame issues and we agree with Mr.
Masaju that that offends 0 XIV R 1(5) of the Civil Procedure Code [Cap. 33 R.
E. 2002] which provides as follows:
(5) At the first hearing of the suit the court shall, after
reading the plaint and the written statements, if any, and
after such examination of the parties as may appear
necessary, ascertain upon what material proposition of fact
or of law the parties are at variance, and shall thereupon
proceed to frame and record the issues on which the right
decision of the case appears to depend.
The High Court itself said in its judgment:
8
Although the court did not formulate the issues to be tried,
the petitioner has framed and both parties have fully argued
on the following issues:
(i) Whether the sections, namely Article 39 (1)
(c) and 39 (2) and Article 67 (b) and 67 (2)
(e) are unconstitutional.
( i i ) Whe ther the said sec t ions meet the
proportionality test?
(iii) Whether the said amendment introduced by
Act No. 34 of 1994 contravenes the
International Instruments signed, ratified
and deposited by the Government of the
United Republic of Tanzania?
The court was thus fully aware of the provisions of the CPC but was also
cognizant of the fact that the petitioner had suggested three issues which
were adopted by the A. G. hook, line and sinker as is apparent in his reply to
the written submissions of Rev. Mtikila:
As long as the issues were not agreed upon between the
parties yet our submissions will discuss them as nearest as
possible.
This Court in Abel Edson Mwakanyamale v. N. B. C. (1997) Ltd. Civil Appeal
No. 63 of 2003 (unreported) cited with approval the observation of Sir
9
BARCLAY NIHIL, P. in Janmohamed Umerdin v. Hussein Amarshi and Three
Others (1953) 20 EACA 4:t at p. 42 that:
It may be that where, as here, neither party asked for
issues, the validity could not be successfully attacked on the
ground that the cour t should have framed issues,
nevertheless, in my view neither the court nor the counsel
are entitled to leave out the requirements of Order 14 Rule
5, this being a rule governing the conduct of a civil
proceeding.
This Court in that same appeal, referred also to MULLA on The Code of
Civil Procedure, 15th edition p. 1421:
The answer depends on the following considerations. If,
though no issue is framed on the fact, the parties adduce
evidence on the fact and discuss it before the Court decides
the point, as if there was an issue framed on it, the decision
will not be set aside in the appeal on the ground merely
that no issue was framed ... The reason is that mere
omission to frame an issue is not fatal to the trial of a suit
unless the omission has affected the disposal of the case on
the merits ..,
The mere omission, on the part of the trial court, to frame
an issue in a matter of controversy between the parties,
10
cannot be regarded as fatal unless, upon examination of the
record, it is found that the failure to frame the issue had
resulted in the parties (i) having gone to the trial without
knowing that the said question was in issue between them,
and (ii) having therefore failed to adduce evidence on the
point.
After reviewing those two authorities this Court said:
In view of the unorthodox procedure followed by the
learned trial judge, we are not certain that the parties had
gone to trial knowing what was the real question between
them, non-payment of the debt or the purported invalidity
of the Mortgage Deed! As we have explained before, the
parties did not adduce any evidence at the trial and so the
decision of the learned trial judge was not based on
evidence.
Their Lordships then set aside the relevant parts of the proceedings that
were affected and ordered a retrial before another judge.
This appeal is a totally different scenario from that of Abel Edson
Mwakanyamale and so we cannot take a leaf from that appeal and order a
retrial. We are of the decided opinion that even if issues were not framed,
11
since the parties being ad idem as to what was at stake, had fully
addressed the points in dispute, and since the court made its decision
based on their submissions, then no injustice was occasioned and this
appellate Court will not interfere solely on that score.
In fact, we are just being consistent with a recent decision of this Court in
Jaffari Sanya Jussa and Another v. Salehe Sadiq Osman, Civil Appeal No.
51 of 2009 (unreported) citing 17th Edition of MuIla at p. 719 which is in pari
materia with page 1421 of the 15th Edition.
We, therefore, dismiss this ground of appeal.
Then Mr. Masaju tackled what had been ground six reading as follows:
That the High Court erred in law and in fact by subjecting
the Constitution to International Instruments.
Mr. Masaju pointed out that the United Republic of Tanzania has not
surrendered its sovereignty in any way and that is why Article 177 B
requires courts, when dealing with disputes, to take into account only the
provisions of the Constitution and laws of the country.
12
However, we agree with Mr. Rweyongeza that International Instruments
were not the conclusive factor in the judgment so even if they were to be
ignored the judgment will remain intact. The learned judges said:
In the event, we agree with the learned counsel for the
petitioner, that the amendments to Articles 21(1), 39(1)(c)
and 67(1)(b) of the Constitution also contravenes the
International Conventions. So we answer the third issue
also in the affirmative. (The emphasis is ours.)
It is clear to us that the word "also" used in the above paragraph meant "in
addition to". Thus the International Conventions were considered in
addition to the position that had already been taken by the court.
This Court in D. P. P. v. Daudi Pete [1993] T. L. R. 22 ruled that reference to
International Instruments is in order when interpreting the Bill of Rights of
our Constitution. This Court said at p. 34:
Tanzania signed the [African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights] on 31 May 1982 and ratified it on 18
February 1984. Since our Bill of rights and Duties was
introduced into the Constitution under the Fifth Amendment
in February 1985, that is, slightly over three years after
Tanzania signed the Charter, and about a year after
13
ratification, account must be taken of that Charter in
interpreting our Bill of Rights and Duties. (Emphasis is
ours.)
So, we are at one with Mr. Rweyongeza in his reply that reference to
International Human Rights Instruments has been ordained by this Court.
We, therefore, cannot fault their lordships in any way and this ground of
appeal is dismissed, too.
In what had been ground 4 the appellant averred:
That the High Court erred in law by assuming legislative
powers.
To beef up this ground Mr. Masaju referred us to what the High Court said:
We shall also declare in the present case that in principle it
shall be lawful for private candidates to contest for the post
of President and Member of Parliament along wi th
candidates nominated by political parties. However, unlike
[LUGAKINGIRA, J.] the learned late judge we will not just
leave it at that. Exercising our powers under any other relief
as prayed in the petition and cognizant of the fact that a
vacuum might gi ve bi r th to chao s a nd pol i t i cal
pandemonium we shal l proceed to order that the
respondent in the true spirit of the original Article 21(1) and
guided by the Fundamental Objectives and Principles of
14
State Policy contained in Part II of the Constitution between
now and the next general elections, put in place, a
legislative mechanism that will regulate the activities of
private candidates. So as to let the will of the people prevail as
to whether or not such candidates are suitable.
Mr. Rweyongeza replied that the High Court merely used its powers under
Article 26 and directed that the articles be dealt with by Parliament. The
learned advocate concluded by saying that "the High Court might have
possibly erred but it certainly did not usurp parliamentary powers".
We are a shade unsure as to what Mr. Rweyongeza meant that "the High
Court might have possibly" erred.
LUGAKINGIRA, J. stated in his judgment "I declare and direct that it shall be
lawful for independent candidates, along with candidates sponsored by
political parties, to contest presidential, parliamentary and local council
elections". Did he strike out the articles which require a prospecting
candidate for election as a President, a Member of Parliament or a Local
Government Councilor to belong to and be sponsored by a political party,
that is, Articles 39, 47 and 67? If he did not do that his declaration and
15
direction that independent candidates are lawful is an empty statement.
Anyway, we are not si t t ing on appeal against the judgment of
LUGAKINGIRA, 1 The A. G. miscalculated in denying this Court that
opportunity in 1994.
But even in this appeal when travelling through what their Lordships said,
as quoted below, we are left speculating:
So in conclusion on the above two issues, we wish to make it
very plain that in our view Act 34 of 1994 which amended
Article 21(1) so as to cross refer it to Articles 5, 39 and 67
which introduced into the Constitution, restrictions on
participation of public affairs and the running of the
government to party members only was an infringement on
the fundamental right and that the restrict ion was
unnecessary and unreasonable, and so did not meet the
test of proportionality. We thus proceed to declare that
the said amendments to Articles 21(1), 39(1)(c) and
67(1)(b) are unconstitutional. (Emphasis is ours.)
One thing which is crystal clear to us is that their Lordships "declared the
said amendments" to be unconstitutional. Did they strike down those
amendments? We think not. They categorically stated that "we shall
16
proceed to order that the [A. G.] between now and the next general
elections, put in place, a legislative mechanism that will regulate
the activities of private candidates".
The A. G., the chief legal advisor of the Executive was to take the
necessary steps to amend the laws and the Constitution so that
independent candidates could be permitted. We are, therefore, of the
settled view that the learned judges did not clothe themselves with
legislative powers. This ground fails, too.
As already said earlier we are going to address grounds one and two
separately despite the consolidation by Mr. Masaju. Ground one provided
as follows:
That the High Court wrongly assumed jurisdiction in
entertaining the Petition.
Mr. Masaju submitted that since the dispute is on articles of the
Constitution of the United Republic then the High Court of Tanzania had no
jurisdiction to construe it. With all due respect to the learned Deputy
Attorney General, we do not think that he seriously contended that. He
17
failed to tell us which court in the whole of the United Republic has the
jurisdiction to construe the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania.
We agree with Mr. Rweyongeza that where the jurisdiction of the High
Court or any court, for that matter, is ousted there has to be an express
provision to that effect. The learned advocate referred us to Article 7 (2)
which states:
The provisions of this Part of this Chapter are not
enforceable by any court. No court shall be
competent to determine the question whether or not
any action or omission by any person or any court, or any
law or judgment complies with the provisions of this Part of
this Chapter. (Emphasis is ours).
Now, "this Chapter" mentioned in that sub-article refers to Chapter One of
the Constitution and "this Part" refers to Part II. Chapter I is titled "The
United Republic, Political Parties, The People and The Policy of Socialism
and Self-Reliance" and Part II is titled "Fundamental Objectives and
Directive Principles of State Policy". Now, those are statements of policy.
What is of crucial importance for our purposes in this appeal is that if
Parliament had intended that all the provisions of the Constitution were not
18
justiciable, as contended by Mr. Masaju, then there would have been an
express provision in line with Art. 7(2). Since there is no such provision
then the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
Where there are such express provisions ousting jurisdiction the courts
observe them and restrain from adjudicating. This Court did just that in
Seif Shariff Hamad v. Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar, Criminal Appeal No
171 of 1992, (unreported) because, though the Court is for the whole
Union, Article 99(2)(a) of the Constitution of Zanzibar, 1984, denies this
Court jurisdiction of interpreting that Constitution in the following terms:
Mahakama ya Rufaa haitakuwa na uwezo wa kusikiliza kesi
zozote zinazohusiana na:-
(a) Tafsiri ya Katiba hii;
We may as well reiterate what we had said in that judgment on 24th
February, 1993, over 17 years ago now:
Tunapendekeza kuwa mamlaka zinazohusika katika pande
zote mbi l i za Muungano zichukue hatua zipasazo
kusawazisha vifungu hivi na vyengine vyenye utata ama
uwezekano wa kuleta utata baina ya hizi Katiba mbili.
That can be translated as follows:
19
We recommend to the relevant authorities on both sides of
the Union, to take necessary steps to harmonize these
conf l ict ing sect ions and other sect ions of the two
constitutions which are potentially irreconcilable.
This is the second time we recite that passage in Seif Shariff Hamad. The
first time was in S. M. Z. v. Machano Khamis Ali & 18 Others, Criminal
Application No. 8 of 2000 (CAT unreported), where we said:
In that appeal we reserved constitutional matters for
political solutions and we disposed the appeal on a
procedural ground. But it is time to look at such provisions
and take remedial steps. The Court will not throw in the
towel but will keep on drawing the attention of the
Powers that be. That is our role.
We should not be taken to be prophets of doom but it is an undisputed fact
that this Court of Appeal contains part of the cream of legal minds in this
United Republic and, therefore, their opinion should be accorded the
weight it deserves. Unfortunately, the Attorney General's Chambers is
oblivious to that naked fact or does not read such important decisions even in
cases where that Chamber is actively involved.
20
To return to the first ground of appeal, apart from the absence of such
prohibition the High Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the petition
because of the constitutional set up of the United Republic of Tanzania
which, according to Art. 2(1), consists of Mainland Tanzania (or what was
formerly Tanganyika Territory) and Tanzania Zanzibar (or what was
formerly Zanzibar Protectorate). In political parlance Tanzania Zanzibar is
simply referred to in Kiswahili as Tanzania Visiwani (Tanzania Islands).
The constitutional set up is that, whereas there is a Constitution and
organs of Tanzania Zanzibar, there is no such Constitution and organs for
Mainland Tanzania. The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania
and its organs, which are referred to as of the United Republic, are for
both the Union and for Mainland Tanzania. Thus the High Court of
Tanzania is both for the Mainland Tanzania and for the Union on matters
pertaining to the Constitution, such as the one that is the subject matter of
this appeal.
So, the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition and ground one
is dismissed in its entirety.
21
Ground 2 was formulated in the following way:
That the High Court erred in law in nullifying the provisions
of the Constitution.
May be we start by saying that it is doubtful whether their Lordships
nullified the provisions of the Constitution. As we have already said they
certainly declared them unconstitutional. Their Lordships, after the
declaration, did not take the next step to nullify or strike out the articles
they found to be objectionable.
So, the issue then is whether the High Court of Tanzania or this Court has
jurisdiction to declare a provision or provisions of an article or articles of
the Constitution to be unconstitutional. Here is where we summoned the
assistance of three friends of the Court: Mr. Othman Masoud, the Director
of Public Prosecutions, Zanzibar; Prof. Palamagamba Kabudi; and Prof.
Jwan Mwaikusa.
Mr. Masaju started by pointing out that courts are entrusted with the
protection of the constitution and that their chambers get worried when
the court strikes out an article of the Constitution. He specifically criticized
their Lordships when they said:
Our Constitution consists of 10 chapters, and some chapters
have several parts. Chapter One has three parts. Part Three
of chapter One has 32 Articles. So Article 30(3) of the
Constitution is only applicable to the enforcement of Part III
of Chapter One of the Constitution. So this court may
indeed declare some provisions of the Constitution,
unconstitutional.
May be we pause here for a while and digest this bit. Article 30 is about
"Limitations upon, and enforcement and preservation of basic rights,
freedoms and duties", now sub-Article (3) provides:
Any person claiming that any provision in this Part of this
Chapter or in any law concerning his right or duty owed to
him has been, is being or is likely to be violated by any
person anywhere in the United Republic, may institute
proceedings for redress in the High Court.
With all due respect, we fail to see how the provisions of Article 30(3) led
their Lordships to conclude that "this court may indeed declare some
provisions of the Constitution, unconstitutional".
23
On the contrary Mr. Rweyongeza's view is that a constitutional amendment
Act is not exempted from review by the courts under Art. 30(3). He
referred us to Art. 368 (1) of the Indian Constitution, which is in pari
materia with our Art. 98 (1). He pointed out that it has been held that the
Indian Parliament cannot use Art 368(1) to amend the basic structure of
the Constitution. He concluded that their Lordships were right to declare
the amendments by Act No. 34 of 1994 to have been unconstitutional as
they meddled with the basic structure of the Constitution, that is,
franchise.
We admit two factual positions: One, Art 98(1) provides for the procedure
of altering the Constitution and does so in the following terms:
Parliament may enact law for altering any provision of this
Constitution in accordance with the following principles:
(Emphasis is ours.)
Those principles are not relevant for this judgment.
24
This Court said in Daudi Pete (supra) that the Kiswahili version of the
Constitution is the authentic one. The Kiswahili version of Art 98(1)(a) and
(b) provide: "kubadilisha masharti yoyote ya Katiba hii".
So, the Parliament can alter "any provision" of the Constitution. We wish to
emphasize "any provision" of the Constitution. Altering has been defined
by Art 98(2) to include:
... modification or correction of those provisions or repeal and
replacement of those provisions or the re-enactment or
modification of the application of the provisions.
We have no doubt in our minds that what the Eleventh Amendment did
was altering Art 21 as explained above.
The second matter is that Art 30(5) provides for the review of any Act of
Parliament in these words:
Where in any proceedings it is alleged that any law enacted
or any action taken by the Government or any other
authority abrogates or abridges any of the basic rights,
freedoms and duties set out in Articles 12 to 29 of this
Constitution, and the High Court is satisfied that the law or
25
action concerned, to the extent that it conflicts with this
Constitution, is void or is inconsistent with this Constitution,
then the High Court, if it deems fit, or if the circumstances
or public interest so requires, instead of declaring that such
law or action is void, shall have the power to decide to
afford the Government or other authority concerned an
opportunity to rectify the defect found in the law or action
concerned an opportunity to rectify the defect found in the
law or action concerned within such a period and such
manner as the High Court shall determine, and such law or
action shall be deemed to be valid until such time the defect is
rectified or the period determined by the High Court
lapses, whichever is the earlier.
The question which arises is whether a law effecting a constitutional
amendment according to Art 98(1) is like any other law passed by
Parliament.
Mr. Masaju contended that a constitutional amendment law is not like any
other law and that it is above ordinary law. That view was opposed by Mr.
Rweyongeza who was supported by Prof Mwaikusa. However, both the DPP
26
of Zanzibar and Prof Kabudi are of the same opinion as Mr. Masaju that a
constitutional amendment law is not like any other law.
The case of Kesavananda Bharat' v. State of Kerala, A. I. R. 1973 SC 1461
has been heavily relied upon in the High Court. We are grateful to Prof
Kabudi who pointed out that Justice KHANNA at p. 1903 stated:
The word 'law' in Art 13(2) does not include amendment of
the Constitution. It has reference to ordinary pieces of
legislation.
We are of the decided opinion that that is so. We say so because an
ordinary legi s lat ion can be enacted by a s imple major i ty of
parliamentarians. That is not so with a constitutional amendment law
whose enactment requires a specific number of votes. Art 98(1)(a) is loud
and clear that:
A Bill for an Act to alter any provisions of this Constitution
(other than those relating to paragraphs (b) of this
subarticle) or any provisions of any law specified in List One
of the Second Schedule to this Constitution shall be
supported by the votes of not less than two thirds of all the
Members of Parliament.
That paragraph speaks for itself but we have to point out that it is twothirds
of all the Members of Parliament and not just those sitting and
voting. An ordinary law is not subjected to that stringent requirement.
The second question that follows is whether such a constitutional
amendment can be reviewed by a court like any other law.
Mr. Othman Masoud and Prof Kabudi were again at one with Mr. Masaju,
that s. 27 of the Interpretation of Laws Act, Cap 1 [RE 2002] provides that
an amending Act is to be construed as one with the amended Act and so
Act No 34 of 1994 should be construed as one with the Constitution.
According to them the cardinal principle of Constitutional interpretation is
to read the entire Constitution as an entity. This Court said so in Julius I.F.
Ndyanabo v. A. G., Civil Appeal No. 64 of 2001. There is, therefore, a need
to harmonize the various articles of the constitution. This means that an
article of a constitution cannot be struck out or declared unconstitutional.
28
We agree with LUGAKINGIRA, J., as he then was, when he stated in Rev.
Christopher Mtikila v. Attorny General [1995] TLR 31 at p. 66, that:
What happens when a provision of the constitution enacting
fundamental right appears to be in conflict with another
provision in the Constitution? In that case the principle of
harmonization has to be called in aid. The principle holds
that the entire Constitution has to be read as integrated
whole, no one particular provision destroying the other but
each sustaining the other...
The learned judge went further:
If the balancing act should succeed, the Court is enjoined to
give effect to all the contenting provisions. Otherwise, the
court is enjoined to incline to the realisation of the
fundamental rights and may for that purpose disregard even
the clear words of a provision if the application will result in
gross injustice.
However, we do not subscribe to his last sentence. The court can never
ever disregard the clear words of a provision of the Constitution. That will
cause anarchy.
29
As Prof. Kabudi submitted there are two exceptions to the general
principle. The first exception is where there is a specific constitutional
provision prohibiting the amendment of certain articles of the constitution or
what are called entrenched provisions which are subject to immutable
principles.
We were given a number of examples of such provisions: Article 89 of the
Constitution of France of 1958, Article 139 of the Constitution of Italy of
1947, Article 288 of the Constitution of Portugal of 1975, and Article 4 of
the Constitution of Turkey of 1982. On the African soil there are Articles
174 to 178 of the Constitution of Algeria, Article 124 of the Constitution of
Chad of 31st March 2006, and also the Constitutions of Malawi, Namibia
and South Africa.
May be we use the case of Turkey to drive home the point of what are
entrenched provisions: Article 4 of the Constitution stipulates that: ... the
provisions of article 1 of the Constitution, establishing
the form of the state as a Republic, the provisions of article 2
on the characteristics of the Republic, and the provisions
30
of ar t icle 3 shal l not be amended, nor shal l thei r
amendment be proposed.
Then Articles 2 provides as follows:
The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social
state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the
concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice;
respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of AtatOrk,
and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the
Preamble.
Article 3 reads as follows:
The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an
indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish. Its flag, the form of
which is prescribed by the relevant law, is composed of a
white crescent and star on a red background. Its national
anthem is the "Independence March". Its capital is Ankara.
Another illustration is Article 178 of The Constitution of Algeria which
expressly prohibits constitutional amendments on:
(1) the republican nature of the State;
(2) the democratic order based on multi-party system;
(3) Islam as the religion of the State;
(4) Arabic as the national and official language;
31
(5) fundamental liberties, and citizen's rights;
(6) integrity of the national territory.
Article 131 of the Constitution of Namibia has an interesting proviso. The
marginal note reads: "Entrenchment of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms".
No repeal or amendment of any of the provisions of Chapter
3, in so far as such repeal or amendment diminishes or
detracts from the fundamental rights and freedoms
contained and defined in that Chapter, shall be permissible
under this Constitution, and no such purported repeal or
amendment shall be valid or have any force or effect.
In such Constitutions if the Constituent Assembly or Parliament
purports to amend such entrenched provisions the courts have power to
declare the amendments to be unconstitutional and strike them out.
The second exception to the general rule is those jurisdictions where the
courts claim to have implied powers to protect "basic structures". The
argument is that the power of Parliament to amend the constitution is
limited. Their lordships in their judgment which is the subject matter of this
appeal said:
32
The Respondent contends that the amendments were
const i tut ional because they were duly enacted by
Parliament who have such powers under Article 98 (1) of
Constitution. We think that is not the issue here. We accept
the proposition that although the Parliament has powers to
enact legislation, such powers are not limitless. As Professor
Issa Shivj i in his ar t icle "Const i tut ional Limi ts of
Parliamentary Powers" published in the special edition of
THE TANZANIA LAWYER October, 2003 put it on p. 93: "...
the power to amend the Constitution is also limited. While it is
true that parliament acting in Constituent capacity can amend
any provision of the Constitution, it cannot do in a manner
that would alter the basic structure or essential features of
the Constitution.
Prof. Shivji cited his authority for that proposition as the decision of the
Supreme Court of India in Kesavananda v. State of Kerala (supra) which,
as already said, featured predominantly in the High Court.
Prof . Kabudi gave the histor ical background of the decision in
Kesavananda. He said that it was a result of a struggle between the
Executive and Parliament which started over the government's bid to effect
land reforms soon after independence. Prof. Kabudi went on to cite
33
pronouncements of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as evidence of the
struggle. We do not think that it is necessary to delve into that for the
purposes of this judgment except to say that at no time in the history of
this country have we had sour relationship between the Executive and the
Judiciary. That is extremely healthy and we wish to maintain it unless it is
absolutely necessary to depart from it.
Prof. Kabudi went further to point out that the Indian Supreme Court was
inspired by the lectures of a German scholar, Prof. Dietrich Conrad, titled
"Implied Limitations of the Amending Power" delivered in 1965 at the
Faculty of Law of the Banaras Hindu University. That is testified to by Prof.
Mahendra.P. Singh, Professor of Law at the University of Delhi in an
obituary article, "Bridging Legal Traditions: Professor Dietrich Conrad, 1932-
2001", published in the Frontline, Vol. 18 – Issue 18, Sep, 01-14, 2001,
and also A.G. Noorani in his article "Behind the 'basic structure'
doctrine: On India's debt to a German jurist, Professor Dietrich Conrad".
We agree with Prof Kabudi that the doctrine is nebulous as there is no
agreed yardstick of what constitutes basic structures of a constitution. In
34
this regard Prof. Shivji himself proposed some instances in his article stated
that the Parliament cannot:
.. amend the 1977 Union Constitution in any of its
provisions, it cannot amend it to change the nature of the
two government union or establish life presidency or abolish
the judiciary or turn the Parliamentary Standing Committee
on Powers, Privileges and Immunities into a court of law.
Such constitutional amendments would be beyond the
powers of the Parliament even in its constituent capacity
and therefore liable to be struck down because they alter
the basic structure of the Constitution.
We shall make our observations on this portion at a later stage. We may
also point out that even Prof. Conrad himself conceded that there is no
litmus test as to what constitutes basic structure. He wrote: in one of his
essays carrying the title "Basic Structure of the Constitution and
Constitutional Principles":
Finally, a note of caution might not be out of place. The
jurisprudence of principles has its own distinct dangers
arising out of the flexibility and lack of precision of principles
as well as their closeness to rhetorical flourish. This might
invite a loosening of judicial discipline in interpreting the
explicit provisions of the Constitution. ... Tightening of
35
judicial scrutiny would be necessary in order to diminish the
dangers of opportunistic use of such principles as mere
political catchwords.
Let us now examine our Constitution of 1977. We have already seen that Art
98(1) provides for the alteration of any provision of the Constitution, that is,
there is no article which cannot be amended. In short there are no basic
structures. What are provided for are safeguards. Under Art 98(1)(a)
constitutional amendments require two-thirds vote of all Members of
Parliament while Art 98(1)(b) goes further that:
A Bill for an Act to alter any provisions of the Constitution or
any provisions of any law relating to any of the matters
specified in List Two of the Second Schedule to this
Constitution shall be passed only if it is supported by the
votes of not less than two-thirds of al l Members of
Parliament from Mainland Tanzania and not less than twothirds
of all Members of Parliament from Tanzania Zanzibar.
List Two of the Second Schedule of the Constitution enumerates eight
matters, to wit:
1. The existence of the United Republic
2. The existence of the Office of the President of the United Republic.
3. The Authority of the Government of the United Republic.
36
4. The existence of the Parliament of the United Republic.
5. The Authority of the Government of Zanzibar.
6. The High Court of Zanzibar.
7. The list of Union Matters.
8. The number of Members of Parliament from Zanzibar.
These eight matters could have been basic structures in the sense that
Parliament cannot amend them. However, they are amendable once the
procedure for amendment is followed. So, there is nothing like basic
structures in our Constitution.
All the examples given by Prof Shivji as basic structures are not so. They
are contained in List Two: The abolishing of two governments is covered in
the authority of the Union Government and that of the Zanzibar
Government. Then the abolishing of the Judiciary is covered in the
existence of the High Court of Zanzibar and the designation of the Court of
Appeal as a Union Matter. All these matters can be amended under Art
98(1)(b). So, the examples given by Prof. Shivji are not basic structures of
the Constitution of Tanzania, 1977.
37
It is our considered opinion that the basic structures doctrine does not
apply to Tanzania and we cannot apply those Indian authorities, which are in
any case persuasive, when considering our Constitution.
After coming to that conclusion there is still an issue glaring at us: What
does the Tanzanian court do when there are articles which cannot be
harmonized?
LUGAKINGIRA, 1 and later J. A., one of our judicial luminaries, confessed to
have been in a dilemma. May be we let him soliloquy:
The position, as I see it, is now this: By virtue of art 21(1)
every citizen is entitled to participate in the government of
the country, and by virtue of the provisions of art 20(4)
such citizen does not have to be a member of any political
party; yet by virtue of art 39(c) and others to that effect, no
citizen can run for office unless he is a member of and
sponsored by a political party. This is intriguing. I am aware
that the exercise of the right under art 21(1) has to be In
accordance with procedure provided by or under the law,' but
I think that while participation through a political party is a
procedure, the exercise of the right of participation through a
political party only is not a procedure but an issue
38
of substance. The message is: either you belong to a
political party or you have no right to participate. There is
additionally the dimension of free elections alluded to in art
21. A citizen may participate in the government 'either
directly or through freely chosen representatives.' It is
contrary to every notion of free elections if non-party
citizens are compelled to vote for party candidates. In the
midst of this unusual dilemma I had to turn to the canons of
statutory and constitutional interpretation.
As we already pointed out at the beginning of this judgment, the learned
judge concluded without declaring the Eighth Amendment to be
unconstitutional. He said:
I declare and direct that it shall be lawful for independent
candidates, along with candidates sponsored by political
parties, to contest presidential, parliamentary and local
council elections.
This Court has already made its stand abundantly clear in Attorney General
v. W. K. Butambala, [1993] T. L. R. 46 at p. 51 when it said:
We need hardly say that our Constitution is a serious and
solemn document. We think that invoking it and knocking
39
down laws or portions of them should be reserved for
appropriate and really momentous occasions.
In that appeal this Court was dealing with the Criminal Procedure Code.
Here it is the Constitution itself. We have to be extra cautious.
That stand in Butambala was taken a step further in Mbushuu Dominic
Mnyaroje And Another v. R, [1995] T. L. R. 97 at p 117:
But the crucial question is whether or not the death penalty is
reasonably necessary to protect the right to life. For this we
say that it is the society which decides. The learned
judge in the above quoted passage acknowledges that
present ly the society deems the death penal ty as
reasonably necessary.
In that appeal the trial judge convicted the appellants of murder, did not
sentence them to hang but used the occasion to strike out the death
sentence as being unconstitutional. The Republic appealed and this Court
conceding that death penalty was inherently inhuman, cruel and degrading
punishment but observed that it was saved by Art 30(2). This Court was of
40
the decided opinion that the issue of annulling death penalty was the
responsibility of Parliament which is aware of public opinion.
In the judgment which is the subject matter of this appeal, their lordships
said:
So as to let the will of the people prevail as to whether or
not such [independent] candidates are suitable.
We are definite that the Courts are not the custodian of the will of the
people. That is the property of elected Members of Parliament.
The High Court of Kenya has the same view as expressed in a very recent
decision in Jesse Kamau & 25 Others v. A. G., [2010] eKLR where 24 clergy
men of various religious institutions challenged the inclusion of Kadhis'
Courts in the Draft Constitution. In their final orders three judges of the
High Court ruled:
As regards paragraph 2 of the prayers we find and hold that
sections 66 and 82 are inconsistent with each other, and
that section 66 is superfluous but it is not the court's role to
expunge it. It is the role of Parliament and the citizenry in a
referendum.
41
So, if there are two or more articles or portions of articles which cannot be
harmonized, then it is Parliament which will deal with the matter and not
the Court unless that power is expressly given by the Constitution, which,
we have categorically said, it has not.
However, situations can arise where the High Court and this Court can
nullify a constitutional provision on the ground that it is unconstitutional in
the sense that it was not enacted as provided for by Art. 98. An example is
where a constitutional amendment is challenged on the grounds that it did
not obtain the prerequisite number of votes according to Art. 98(1)(a). We
already pointed out earlier that generally a constitutional amendment
requires the support of a two-thirds majority and under Art 98(1)(b) the
support of two-thirds majority of all the Members of Parliament from
Zanzibar and all Members of Parliament from the Mainland. If such a
challenge is sustained then the court might have to find that the article has
not been enacted in accordance with the constitutional provisions and is,
therefore, unconstitutional.
In such a situation the courts will be performing its constitutional function
of maintaining checks and balances. Otherwise, Tanzanian courts exercise
42
calculated restraint to avoid meddling in constituencies of the other two
pillars of the State. This has been amply demonstrated in numerous
decisions. LUGAKINGIRA, J., himself in his ruling in Rev. Mtikila's case
refused many prayers as being not justiciable. We agree with Prof
Mwaikusa that it is a pity that that ruling has not been reported. We
recommend to the Editorial Committee to report it.
Another example of such judicial restraint is Mwalimu Paul John Mhozya v.
Attorney General (No. 1) [1996] TLR 130 (HC). The applicant sought an
interlocutory injunction to restrain the President of the United Republic of
Tanzania from discharging his functions pending a determination of the
main case in which the applicant sought orders of declaration that: (a) the
Constitution of the United Republic had been violated; (b) the President
was guilty of having allowed or enabled the said violation; and (c) the
continued exercise of presidential powers by President Ali Hassan Mwinyi
was unconstitutional and a potential danger to the well being of the
country and its citizens. It was held, inter alia,:
(iii) The principle that the functions of one branch of
government should not encroach on the functions of
another branch is an important one to ensure that the
43
governing of a state is executed smoothly and
peacefully;
(iv) No provision of the Constitution or any other law
authorises the High Court to hold that the President
can be removed or suspended from office by a body
other than that which the Constitution specifically
provides for;
(v) This Court has no jurisdiction to issue the order of
injunction sought against the President.
Ground one is, therefore, allowed: a court cannot declare an article of the
Constitution to be unconstitutional except where the article has not been
enacted in accordance with the procedure under Art 98(1)(a) and (b).
After saying all that it is obvious that we cannot legally say that
independent candidates are allowed. That is the province of Parliament to
amend the Constitution according to Art 98(1).
We may as well add that apart from the legal argument we have advanced
there is a purely practical issue. Where will we stop? The argument is that
the provisions of Art 21 have been abridged since a candidate has to
belong to and be sponsored by a political party. The next complaint will be
44
why should a parliamentary candidate be required to be of the age of 21
years and a presidential candidate 40 years? Why not be the age of
majority of 18 years? Also why should the presidential candidate be a
citizen born in Tanzania? Why do we exclude those born outside the
Republic simply because their parents were faithfully serving the Republic
outside the country? Are all these not abridging Art 21?
Having said all this, and having made our conclusion obviously clear, we
now turn to a litigation which is on all fours with this current appeal: the
case before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Jorge Castalieda
Gutman v. Mexico. Briefly stated the facts in this case are as follows:
On 05/03/2004 Jorge applied to the General Council of Federal Electoral
Institute to be registered as an independent presidential candidate claiming
to exercise his rights under Art 35 (II) of the Mexican Constitution which
reads as follows:
Article 35. The citizen shall have the following prerogatives:
II. To be able to be elected for any elected public office
and appointed to any other employment or assignment,
45
if he complies with the requirements established by law;
(The emphasis is ours).
The application was refused because an Electoral Law provides:
... only the national political parties have the right to
request the registration of candidates to elected office.
(Emphasis is ours).
Jorge unsuccessfully exhausted local remedies so, on 12th October, 2005, he
filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights which
made certain recommendations to the Mexican Government and gave it
two months to report on actions taken to implement them. As time lapsed
and no progress was made, the Commission lodged before the Court an
application against Mexico:
... to claim the constitutionality of political rights and the
consequent impediment for Jorge Castalieda Gutman ... to
register his independent candidacy for the presidency of
Mexico [in the elections held in July 2006].
After disposing four preliminary objections and a lengthy deliberation
covering 251 paragraphs and 61 pages, seven judges of the Court
concluded its judgment in the following terms in relevant parts:
46
DECLARES,
unanimously, that:
3. The State did not violate, to the detriment of Jorge
Castarieda Gutman, the political right to be elected
recognized in Article 23(1)(b) of the American Convention
on Human Rights, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof, in
the terms of paragraphs 134 to 205 of this judgment.
Art 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides:
Article 23. Right to participate in government
1. Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and
opportunities:
a. to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives;
b. to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections,
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret
ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the
voters; and
c. to have access, under general conditions of equality, to
the public service of his country.
2. The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and
opportunities referred to in the preceding paragraph only on
the basis of age, nat ional i ty, residence, language,
education, civil and mental capacity, or sentencing by a
competent court in criminal proceedings
Art 23 goes much further than our Art 21, yet the Electoral Law, and NOT
the Constitution, as is in our case, was held not to violate it.
47
In our case, we say that the issue of independent candidates has to be
settled by Parliament which has the jurisdiction to amend the Constitution
and not the Courts which, as we have found, do not have that jurisdiction.
The decision on whether or not to introduce independent candidates
depends on the social needs of each State based on its historical reality.
Thus the issue of independent candidates is political and not legal
However, we give a word of advice to both the Attorney General and our
Parliament: The United Nations Human Rights Committee, in paragraph 21 of
its General Comment No. 25, of July 12, 1996, said as follows on Article 25
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, very similarly
worded as Art 23 of the American Convention and our Art 21:
The right of persons to stand for election should not be
limited unreasonably by requiring candidates to be members of
parties or of specific parties.
Tanzania is known for our good record on human rights and particularly
our militancy for the right to self determination and hence our involvement
48
in the liberation struggle. We should seriously ponder that comment from a
Committee of the United Nations, that is, the whole world.
Each party is to bear its own costs both in this Court and below.
DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 17th day of June, 2010.
A. S. L. RAMADHANI
CHIEF JUSTICE
E . N . M U N U O
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
J . H . S O F F E
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
N . P . K I M A R O
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
49
4 -JR a t
M. S. MBAROUK
STICE OF
APPEAL
B.M. LUANDA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
S. MJASIRI
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

END
Imeletwa kwenu na Happiness Katabazi

MATATIZO YA UZAZI YAKABILIWE KWA MBINU MPYA

WAPENZI wasomaji wa safu hii leo tena nawakaribisheni kwenye safu hii ili muwezi kushiriki nami katika kujadili, kutafari mada ambazo nimekuwa nikiziibua na kuzijadili kupitia safu hii.

Wiki ,ya pili imepita sasa toka niliandika makala iliyokuwa na kichwa cha habari kisemacho “Malaria inakubalika Tanzania”.Napenda kuwashukuru wote walionipigia simu na kunitumia ujumbe mfupi wa kunipongeza kuhusiana na makala hiyo na pia napenda kumshukuru msomaji mmoja ambaye alijitambulisha yeye ni mpenzi wa makala zangu ila kwa makala hiyo alitoautiana na mimi kwasababu neti zile za Olyset zimewekwa kinga za kutosha na kwamba haziruhusu kupitisha mbu anayeambukiza ugonjwa wa maralia ila zinaruhusu kupitisha mbu ambaye anaambuzika matende.

Nilipingana wazi wazi na msomaji huyo ambaye alijitambulisha yeye ni mtaalamu na mkazi wa Tanga kwa kumweleza wazi mfuko ulioifadhia chandarua hicho cha Olyset, umeandika kwamba chandarua hicho kimewekwa dawa inayozuia mbu yoyote asiweze kusogelea kwenye neti hiyo.Hivyo msomaji huyo alivyonieleza hayo nilimtaka arejee mfuko wa kuifadhi chandarua hicho kimeandikwa nini. Na wasomaji wangu hiyo ndiyo demokrasia ya kuruhusu wasomaji kunikosoa kwa hoja na vielelezo na si vinginevyo.Nawashukuru sana .

Lakini leo katika safu hii nitazungumzia mada mpya ambayo kadri siku zinavyozidi kwenda imeanza kuonekana ni tatizo ambalo limeanza kutanuka katika jamii yetu ya Tanzania , hali inayopeleka baadhi ya watu kuanza kuhoji kwamba kupotea kwa uwezo wa jamii kuzaa, ni janga la taifa?



Katika vinjari zake ndani ya Jamii, Fukuto la Jamii , limekumbana na tatizo la kijamii linaloainisha kwamba watu watatu kati ya watu 10 niliozungumza nao wamesema jamii imeanza kupoteza kuzaa.

Hii ina maana kwamba kati ya watu wakiwa wanawake au watu 10 wakiwa wanaume, sita kati ya jumla ya watu 20 hawazai.

Kutozaaa kwa watu hao sita, hakujulikani kumesababishwa na nini.Baadhi yao wamedai kwamba wanapimwa vipimo vya uzazi mahospitalini na wanabainika hawana tatizo lolote linaloweza kuwazuia kupata ujazito na kisha kuzaa watoto.

Kwa kuwa jambo hili lina makandokando yake ni vigumu kwa Fukuto la Jamii kujua kama juhudi zote za kitalaamu zingefanyika wengi kati ya hao sita wangepata watoto.

Lakini idadi ya watu wa tatu kati ya kumi inaashiria asilimia 30 ,kiwango ambacho ni cha juu mno kwa tatizo kama hili. Wataalamu wa afya watanisahihisha nikiwa nimekosea lakini isingetemewa tatizo hili lizidi asilimi 1 hadi 1.5.

Fukuto la Jamii , linaona hili ni eneo linalogusa uhai wa jamii na uendelevu wake hivyo ni eneo nyeti linalostahili kutupiwa macho kitalaamu zaidi.

Itafurahisha tukijua wanajamii bado wanauwezo wa kuzaa bila matatizo pale inapoitajika.Kushindwa kuzaa panapohitajika,ni tatizo na kero, mateso kwa wanandoa na wale waliofikia umri wa kuzaa.

Wengi wanaopatwa na tatizo hili usononeka kimya kimya na ulichukulia kama ni tatizo binafsi , bahati mbaya, kulogwa na mkosi.

Lakini hili ni jambo ambalo jamii kwa pamoja inawajibika kuguswa naloi na kulitafutia ufumbuzi.Ni vyema utafiti ufanywe na wataalamu wa sekta ya afya na tiba kujua ukubwa wa tatizo lenyewe na kujaribu kupata chanzo chake.

Je ni mfumo wa maisha na wanajamii kwa maana ya vyakula, vinjwaji, madawa, uchafuzi wa mazingira, hewa chafu,nk.?

Je ni uwepo wa madini au vichocheo vingine vya kiasili au visivyo vya kiasili ndivyo vinasababisha tatizo hilo au ni ukahaba, utoaji mimba wa kupindukia wa baadhi ya wanawake enzi wakiwa wasichana, ulevi wa pombe, utumiaji wa dawa za kulevya au kutozifuata mila na desturi zilizowekwa na mababu zetu nk?

Haya yote ya yapo ndani ya jamii yetu lakini si vyema wanajamii kuwa wavivu katika kufikiri kuchukua njia ya mkato au kutoa majibu ya mkato kuhusu tatizo hili ambalo hivi sasa tunashuhudia ndoa nyingi zikisambaratika muda mfupi baada ya kufungwa ukiuliza sababu ni mmoja wa wanandoa hao hana uwezo wa kuzaa.Inauzunisha kweli.

Mungu ibariki Tanzania , Mungu ibariki Afrika.

Chanzo:Gazeti la Tanzania Daima la Jumapili, Juni 20 mwaka 2010

HAKIMU AGNES MCHOME ACHA UZEMBE

Na Happiness Katabazi

IJUMAA ya wiki hii Mahakama Kuu Kanda ya Dar es Salaam , ilibadilisha masharti ya dhamana yaliyokuwa na Mahakama ya wilaya ya Ilala katika kesi ya matumuzi mabaya ya ofisi ya umma inayomkabili aliyekuwa Mkurugenzi wa Benki Kuu, Simon Jengo na wenzake wawili.


Mbali na Jengo,washitakiwa wengine ni aliyekuwa Naibu Mkurugenzi wa Fedha za Nje, Kisima Mkango na Mkurugenzi wa Huduma za Benki Kuu, Ally Bakari, ambao wanatetewa na mawakili wa kujitegemea maarufu nchini,Richard Rweyongeza na Mabere Marando.

Uamuzi huo ulitolewa na Jaji Emilian Mushi ,ambaye bila kumung’unya maneno alisema amefikia uamuzi wa kubadilisha masharti hayo ya dhamana yaliyotolewa na Hakimu Mfawadhi Agnes Mchome,na kuweka masharti mapya ya dhamana, ni baada yakubaini hakimu huyo alikosea kisheria kutumia kifungu cha 148 (5)(e) cha Sheria ya Makosa ya Jinai ya mwaka 2002 katika shauri hilo.

“Hakimu Mchome hakuwa makini,alizembea kiasi cha kushindwa kung’amua kwamba hati ya mashtaka haikutaja thamani ya idadi ya noti zilizochapishwa….hivyo kwa uzembe huo hakimu huyo akajikuta anatumia kifungu hicho ambacho hakipaswi kutumika katika kesi hii kutoa dhamana…kwa hiyo mahakama hii inatoa masharti mapya ya dhamana kama ifuatavyo”alisema Jaji Mushi.

Kila mshtakiwa atapaswa kusaini bondi ya Sh milioni tano, awe na wadhamini wawili ambao ni watumishi wa serikali ambao watakaguliwa na Naibu Msajili wa Mahakama Kuu kanda ya Dar es Salaam,kusalimisha hati ya kusafiria,hawataruhusiwa kutoka nje ya jiji bila kibali cha Kamanda wa polisi kanda maalum ya dar es Salaam,kwenda kuripoti Mahakama ya Ilala ilikujua kesi yao ya msingi imepangwa tarehe gani.Washtakiwa wote juzi walimiza masharti hayo ya dhamana wakaruhusiwa kurejea uraiani kuungana na familia zao baada ya kusota rumande kwa miezi kumi sasa.

Itakumbukwa kwamba hakimu Mchome alitoa masharti hayo ya dhamana Mei 7 mwaka huu, ikiwa ni dakika chache tu baada ya mahakama hiyo kuwafutia kesi ya awali ya uhujumu uchumi na kuisababishia serikali hasara ya Sh bilioni 500 bada ya mahakama hiyo kupokea hati ya Mkurugenzi wa Mashtaka (DPP),Elizer Feleshi ambayo aliliwasilisha chini ya kifungu cha 91(1) cha Sheria ya Makosa ya jinai, ambayo ilisema DPP hana haja kuendelea na kesi hiyo ambayo ilisababisha washtakiwa hao kusota rumande kwa miezi tisa baada ya kushindwa kutimiza masharti ya dhamana yaliyomtaka kila mmoja kutoa fedha au kuwasilisha hati ya mali yenye thamani ya Sh bilioni 14.Kesi hiyo iliyofutwa ilifunguliwa rasmi mahakamani hapo Septemba 15 mwaka jana.

Licha ya siku hiyo ya Mei 7 mwaka huu, kufutiwa kesi hiyo na mahakama, washtakiwa hao walijikuta dakika chache baadaye wakikamatwa tena na kufunguliwa kesi Na.359 ya mwaka huu, na wakili wa serikali Ephrey Sedekia mbele ya hakimu Mchome, lidai kuwa washtakiwa katika kesi hiyo mpya wanakabiliwa na mashtaka matatu.

Wakili wa Sedekia alieleza kuwa kosa la kwanza,walilifanya 2004, kwa kuchapisha noti zenye idadi ya 500,000,000. Wakili Sedekia, alidai shtaka la pili linafanana na la kwanza ambapo wanadaiwa kutumia nyaraka hizo kumdanganya mwajiri wao ili aweze kuongeza idadi ya kuchapisha noti yenye idadi hiyo mwaka 2005.

Aidha, wakili alidai shtaka la tatu ni la kutumia madaraka yao vibaya, ambapo watuhumiwa hao kwa pamoja wakiwa na nafasi zao,waliongeza idadi ya uchapishaji noti na kufikia 1,400,000,000 mwaka 2004.

Masharti hayo ya dhamana yaliyowataka washtakiwa watoenusu ya thamani ya fedha zilizotajwa kwenye hati ya mashtaka wakati hati ya hiyo ya mashtaka haikutaja thamani ya fedha isipokuwa ilitaja idadi ya hizo za noti zilizochapwa, yaliyotolewa siku hiyo na hakimu Mchome na hivyo kusababisha washtakiwa kuendelea kusota rumande kwa kushindwa kutimiza masharti hayo hadi juzi asubuhi walipofikishwa mahakama kuu na mchana kufanikiwa kupata dhamana baada ya kutimiza masharti mapya yaliyotolewa na mahakama hiyo ya juu.

Chini ya kifungu cha 148(5)(e)cha Sheria ya makosa ya Jinai,mahakama ina mamlaka kumuamuru mshtakiwa anayes kwa kosa linalohusu fedha inayozidi sh milioni 10 ,mshtakiwa atatakiwa atoe nusu ya kiasi anachotuhumiwa kuiba au kusababisha hasara ndiyo apate dhamana.

Hivyo ndivyo ilivyotokea kwenye kesi hii inayowakabili walshtakiwa hao iliyofunguliwa katika mahakama ya wilaya ya Ilala.Washtakiwa hao hawakulidhika na masharti ya dhamana ya mahakama hiyo ya chini na wakaamua kuwasilisha ombi na.24 ya mwaka huu, Mahakama Kuu, ili mahakama hiyo ya juu iweze kubadilisha masharti ya dhamana kwakuwa yamekosewakupita kiasi na yanawauiza kwa kuwanyima uhuru.

Juni 4 mwaka huu, washtakiwa hao kupitia mawakili walimweleza Jaji Mushi kupita hati ya kiapo kilichoapwa na wakili Mabere Marando kwamba mashtka hayo matatu yanayowakabili wateja wake,yanadai walichapisha idadi ya noti 1,400,000,000.Na kwamba idadi hiyo ya noti haikutajwa kwa thamani yake.

Ombi la utetezi liliungwa mkono na Wakili mwandamizi wa serikali Timon Vitalis aliyekuwa akisaidiwana Ephrey Sedekia.Hatua hiyo ya mawakili hawa wa serikali imeonyesha ni waadilifu na weledi wa taaluma ya sheria ,kwani kwa vinywa vyao walikiri kwamba hati ya mashtaka imetaja idadi ya noti zilizochapishwa na wala haikutaja thamani ya noti hizo jambo ambalo linafaya matumuzi ya kifungu cha 148(5) (e) cha sheria ya makosa ya jinai,katika kesi hii ni batili.

Ili kutoa haki na kupunguza mlolongo wa urasimu,uamuzi huu wa jaji Mushi , unazua hoja kwenye safu hii ya Fukuto la Jamii ambayo imekuwa mstari wa mbele kuatilia kesi mbalimbali ikiwemo kesi hii tangu ifunguliwe hadi juzi yalipotolewa masharti mapya, kwamba baadhi ya watendaji wa vyombo vya dola waliokabidhiwa mamlaka ya kutoa haki bila upendeleo wala husuda, hawafanyi hivyo.Sababu zinaweza kuwa nyingi rushwa,uzembe,ukosefu wa umakini,uoga au udhaifu katika taaluma ya sheria.

Vyovyote iwavyo sababu zote hizo zinajenga hisia hasi kwa jamii dhidi ya mhimili wa mahakama na na serikali kwa ujumla.Tunachoweza kusema iweje waajiriwe watu wanaoweza kuchukua maamuzi kama haya ya hakimu Mchome ambayo yamesababisha washtakiwa ambao wanategemewana familia zao kusota rumande?

Je thamani ya uhuru wa watu iko wapi? Tunachoweza kusema ni kwamba wakati umefika sasa kutupia macho aina ya watendajiwa mhimili wa mahakama tulionao.

Wale wenye taaluma dhaifu ama waondolewe na wasipewe fursa ya kuhujumu haki za watu jambo ambalo linaiaibisha mhimili wa mahakama na kuidhalilisha taaluma ya sheria.

Sheria ilipoweka vifungu vinavyoruhusu rufaa,mapitio, marejeo,masahiisho,haina maana kwamba sheria hiyo inaruhusu baadhi ya mahakimu na majaji kuwa wazembe,kutokuwa makini na kwa ujumla kuna hujumu haki.

Lengo la vifungu kama hivyo ni kurekebisha makosa ya kiufundi na ya kibinadamu lakini uamuzi wa mshartiya dhamana yaliyotolewa na hakimu huyo ,umeonekana kuwa ni wa kizembe na wala hauna jinsi ya kuelezea wala kuutetea.

Wakati umefika sasa baadhi ya sheria za nchi zibadilishwe ili kutoa fursa kwa wananchi wenzetu wanaokosewa haki na mahakama zetu kuweza kupata fidia na mahakimu na majaji wanaowakasesha haki wananchi hao wawajibike.

Haki na uhuru wa mahakama uliotamkwa na ibara ya 107B ya Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania ya mwaka 1977,usitafsiliwe kwa maana hasi ya kuweka kinga ya baadhi ya mahakimu na majaji wasiyo makini.

Fukuto la Jamii,linawaasa majaji na mahakimu kuwa na taadhari kwa wananchi wenzetu wanaoletwa mbele zenu ni watuhumiwa tu siyo wahalifu na wakati huo tambueni wengine ni raia wema na wenye familia zinazowategemea wakati ukweli ni kwamba wamebambikiziwa kesi kwasababu ya chuki binafsi,umbeya na hata visasi vya kisiasa na kibiashara na kunyang’anya wanawake.

Matatizo kama hayo ya kubambikiziana kesi ni matokeo ya mfumo hai wa utendaji wa vyombo vya dola ambayo yanaweza kumkuta mtu yoyote.

Tunafahamu fika kwamba wapo baadhi ya mahakimu wanaokubali kirahisi kulogwa kizungu ‘kupokea rushwa’ ili wapindishe haki za watu,wapo pia mahakimu waoga kufikia maamuzi yanayojali misingi ya haki badaya yake wanatoa hukumu za kuwakandamizi makusudi wananchi wasiyo na hatia kwa vile tu mahakimu hao wamepokea maelekezo ya kupindika haki toka kwa baadhi ya viongozi serikalini na wanasiasa.

Na baadhi ya mahakimu hao bila haya wakati wanatoa hukumu hizo utawasikia wakisema wamefikia hatua za kumuona mshtakiwa fulani ana hati kwasababu eti Taifa hivi sasa lipo kwenye vita dhidi wa badhilifu wa fedha za umma ingali mashtaka aliyoshtakiwa nayo mshtakiwa hayausiani kabisa na wizi wala ubadhilifu.

Mahakimu wengine wanatumia kinga ya uhuru wa mahakama kutoa hukumu zinazowakandamiza baadhi ya washtakiwa idi mradi tu hakimu huyo amenyimwa rushwa na mshtakiwa, au hakimu huyo ameaidiwa na viongozi wenye hulka za kinyang’au serikalini kumfunga mshtakiwa fulani bila hata ushahidi wa kutosha wa kumtia mtu hatiani na mwisho wa siku tunashuhudia maisha ya baadhi ya mahakimu wa aina hiyo maisha yao uanza kuwanyokea.

Na haya mambo yapo wananchi tunayashuhudia katika baadhi ya maamuzi ya kesi mbalimbali na pia kuambiwa kwa siri na baadhi ya mahakimu wanaofuata maadili ya kazi yao na matapeli wanaokaa nje ya mahakama zetu hususani katika Mahakama ya Hakimu Mkazi Kisutu na Mahakama ya Wilaya ya Ilala, ambao watu hao ambao wanadaiwa kuwa mabingwa wa kuwasaidia washtakiwa kupata hati wanazozitumia ili wapate dhamana mahakamani na watu.

Kwanza nikiri kwamba ‘wajanja’ambao kutwa wanashinda mahakamani wanamtandao mpana sana unaowawezesha kupenya kilaini kwa baadhi ya mahakimu na mawakili wa serikali ‘watoto wa Eliezer Feleshi ‘ wenye hulka za kifisadi ambao wanasikiliza kesi za washtakiwa wa wanaowatuhumiwa watu hao,kucheza mchezo mchafu wa kutumia taaluma yao ya kisheria kupendekeza kwa viongozi hao watoe kibali cha kuzifuta kesi za washtakiwa wa aina hiyo na kweli ufisadi wao unafanikiwa.Hilo ndilo Fukuto la Jamii kwa leo.

Mungu ibariki Tanzania, Mungu ibariki Afrika.mwisho

Chanzo:Gazeti la Tanzania Daima Jumapili, Juni 13 mwaka 2010